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CHARTER CHALLENGES:
A TEST CASE
FOR THEORIES OF LAW°
By W.J. WALUCHOW*
The author's primary objective is to show that versions of legal positivism,
according to which legal validity sometimes depends on moral validity
(Inclusive Legal Positivism), are theoretically preferable to those forms
of positivism (Exclusive Legal Positivism) which deny this possibility. The
author attempts to substantiate this conclusion by demonstrating that
Inclusive Legal Positivism provides a better theoretical account of
challenges to legal validity based on a document like the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. His secondary aim is to show that the
choice between Inclusive and Exclusive Legal Positivism can have
important consequences for legal practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the existence of valid, positive law ever depend on
moral considerations? To this question, defenders of Natural Law
Theory (NLT) are thought emphatically to answer "Yes, and
necessarily so. An unjust law seems to be no law at all." Defenders
of Legal Positivism (LP), by contrast, are thought to answer with a
resounding "No, and necessarily so. The existence of law is one
thing, its merit or demerit quite another. The existence of a valid,
positive law is entirely a function of its pedigree, that is, by the
manner in which it becomes law."
In recent years, this conventional approach has met with
serious challenge. John Finnis argues that "a theory of natural law
need not have as its principal concern, either theoretical or
° Copyright, 1990, W.J. valuchow
*V.J. Waluchow, Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.
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pedagogical, the affirmation that 'unjust laws are not laws'."' Others
suggest that LP is in no way wedded to a denial that moral standards
can ever serve as criteria for determining the existence or the
content of positive law. They argue that moral considerations
sometimes figure in arguments purporting to establish or challenge
legal validity, or in arguments intended to determine the scope,
extent, or meaning of positive law. On earlier occasions, I joined
the ranks of those eager to substantiate these latter suggestions
regarding LP.2 I argued that it is consistent with LP to suggest that
the identification of a standard as valid, positive law can depend on
substantive moral arguments. As an example, it was urged that a
legal positivist's ultimate criteria for legal validity (for instance,
H.L.A. Hart's rule of recognition) might well incorporate distinctly
moral tests. Were this true, then according to LP, the actual validity
of a purportedly valid law might, on some occasion, be a function of
its "moral merit." The simple fact of its enactment by Parliament,
for example, would be insufficient to determine the standard's
validity. One might further be required to decide whether it passes
the appropriate moral tests. What permits us to view such tests as
compatible with LP is that their existence is in no way necessary for
law. Rather, their existence is contingent upon social practice.
Moral tests exist as constraints on legal validity, only if, as a matter
of social fact, they have the appropriate pedigree, such as being
explicitly incorporated into a constitutional charter or bill of rights.3
Another of my arguments was that versions of LP which
recognize the possibility (indeed the frequent existence) of
"pedigreed," or legally accepted, moral tests for legal validity are
theoretically preferable to NLT or any version of LP which denies
that possibility. In an attempt to support this claim, I pointed to
challenges to legal validity made under documents like the Canadian
1 I Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 351.
2 See W. Waluchow, "Herculean Positivism" (1985) 5 Oxford . Leg. Stud. 187
[hereinafter Herculean Positivism] and W. Waluchow, 'The Weak Social Thesis" (1989) 9
Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 23 [hereinafter The Weak Social Thesis].
3 See Herculean Positivism, ibid, at 192-96.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 I suggested that these Charter
challenges typically involve substantive moral arguments. It is
mistaken to view such arguments as anything but attempts to
demonstrate either that pedigreed criteria for legal validity have not
been satisfied, and that what seems to be valid law is in fact no law
at all, or that a law must be understood or interpreted in such a way
that it does not infringe upon a pedigreed moral right protected by
the Charter. In the former instance, morality figures in arguments
purporting to establish or challenge the existence of valid law. In
the latter case, it figures in arguments purporting to establish the
content of valid law, the law contained within the instruments (for
example, the statutes or precedents) employed for its expression. If
my construal of Charter challenges is correct, then it follows that the
existence and content of law does indeed sometimes depend on
moral factors. It further follows that any version of LP which
accepts this as a theoretical possibility is, on that account alone,
superior to one which does not. In this essay, I shall refer to the
first kind of LP as "Inclusive Legal Positivism" (iLP) and the second
as "Exclusive Legal Positivism" (ELP). According to iLP, moral
standards are included within the possible grounds a legal system
might adopt for determining the existence and content of valid law.
ELP, by contrast, logically excludes the adoption of such grounds.S
My primary objective in the present paper is to develop
further the argument that iLP is a sounder theory of law than ELP
because it offers a better theoretical account of Charter challenges.
A secondary objective is to show that the choice between iLP and
ELP (or between one of them and some third competitor) is not an
idle curiosity. The choice is an important one, not merely for
traditional debates within philosophy concerning the nature of law,
but ultimately for legal practice as well. It is tempting to think,
contra Bentham and Hart, that traditional theories concerning the
4Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter].
5 Following Raz's lead, I earlier referred to ILP as the '"Veak social thesis" and ELP as
the "strong social thesis." I have chosen to adopt this new terminology to better convey the
essential differences between the two kinds of LP, and to deny Raz the rhetorical advantage
of having his theory perceived as "strong' and mine as '"veak."
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nature of law have little if any bearing upon the actual practice of
law.6  Whether they espouse legal realism, legal positivism, or
natural law theory, indeed whether they have anything remotely like
a theory of law at all, judges will go about their business in the
usual manner. For example, when faced with a seriously unfair but
binding precedent, the judge adopting NLT will argue, "This is unfair
and not law; therefore, I should perhaps not apply it in this case,
even if it does satisfy all the legally recognized tests of validity."
The judge adopting LP, on the other hand, will argue, "Though this
is law because it satisfies all the legally recognized tests of validity,
it may none the less be too unfair for me to apply in this case." In
each instance, the same steps will probably be taken and the end
result will likely be the same (the precedent is overridden instead of
applied); this occurs despite the different descriptions under which
those steps are taken and the end result conceived. If the two
judges do differ in their solutions to the dilemma posed, it will not
be because of any differences they might have concerning the
respective merits of LP versus NLT.
The same will be true, it might be thought, in situations
where the law is unsettled, perhaps because the meaning or
implication of a statute is unclear. The judge adopting NLT will look
to his moral theory for help in deciding what the law really requires
in the case before him. Human law, on his view, is a vehicle for the
expression and implementation of the moral law, and when for some
reason it fails to express that higher law, it is incumbent upon a
judge to appeal directly to the higher source. As for the judge
adopting LP, she too may repair to moral theory to help solve the
riddle left by positive law. There is little reason to think that her
answer will necessarily be any different from the one provided by
her NLT counterpart. It is likely, though, that she will conceive the
process of finding that answer somewhat differently. She will view
that process, not as the discovery of pre-existing, higher law, but as
the discretionary creation of new law in fulfilment of her
6 For a discussion of Hart and Bentham on the practical consequences of traditional legal
theory, see The Weak Social Thesis, supra, note 2 at 26-29. See also D.N. MacCormick, "A
Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law" (1985) 20 Val. U.L. Rev. 1 at 9-11 and P. Soper,
"Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds" in 3. Coleman & E. Paul, eds, Philosophy and
Law (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1987) at 31-48.
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quasi-legislative, judicial responsibility to fill in gaps left by positive
law.
We should resist the tempting view that philosophical
reflection about the nature of law offers legal practice nothing
except different descriptions of what judges do. My secondary aim,
then, will be to give some credence to this claim. I shall do so by
relating my investigation of the merits of ILP over ELP to current
disputes in constitutional theory about the nature, justification, and
proper extent of judicial review. More specifically, I will consider
briefly various views regarding the interpretation of charters or bills
of rights; whether, as the jargon has it, interpretation should be
confined to "the four corners" of the document or whether a more
liberal approach is the better course. It is obvious that much of
practical importance hinges on how these particular disputes are
settled. It takes little imagination to see how a court more firmly
wedded to a narrow, literalist approach to constitutional adjudication
might have decided Roe v. Wade or R. v. Morgentaler.7 It may not be
so clear, however, how philosophical thought about the nature of
law could have any serious bearing on how these cases were or
could have been decided. But as we shall see, there are indeed
important theoretical and pragmatic connections here which can
have a profound bearing on practice. Depending on her theory of
law, a judge may view a liberal approach to Charter challenges as
the naked usurpation of the legislative role, or alternatively, a simple
attempt to interpret and determine the scope of existing law,
something judges do all the time and which requires no special
justification.
II. ILP VS. ELP
The overall objective of this section is to show that ILP
provides a better theoretical account of the moral argument which
sometimes takes place in Charter challenges. Our first order of
business, then, must be to substantiate the premise that moral
7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); R v. Morgentaler (1986), 52 O.R. (2d) 353 (CA.),
aff'd [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Morgentaler cited to S.C.R.].
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argument does indeed sometimes take place in such cases. Without
this premise, the argument cannot even begin to get off the ground.
It might seem obvious that Charter challenges rely on moral
arguments. After all, in listing fundamental rights and freedoms, the
Charter uses terminology which figures prominently in virtually all
modem moral theories. The right to equality (section 15), for
instance, is a paradigm moral right. So too is the right not to be
deprived of liberty except in accordance with fundamental justice
(section 7). But the mere use of terms which admit of moral
meanings is, in itself, clearly insufficient to establish our premise.
From the fact that two normative systems share a certain common
vocabulary, it fails to follow that their common terms have identical
referents or that they have identical or even similar meanings. This
is obviously true in the case of law and morals. The interpretation
given to a legal term is often quite different from the corresponding
moral term. One who plea bargains a murder charge down to
manslaughter may yet be morally condemned as a murderer. What
is legally judged to be fair business practice may quite properly be
assessed as morally unfair, and so on. So the mere use of moral
terminology within the Charter is itself of little argumentative force.
Yet, perhaps it is not the terminology itself which is of
importance, but rather the way the judiciary has come to approach
and understand it. As should now be clear, most Canadian judges
have been willing to adopt a non-legalistic, broad, purposive, or
liberal approach to the Charter. In Big M Drug Mart, for instance,
the then Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court, Brian
Dickson, had this to say concerning the proper method of Charter
adjudication:
In Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, this Court expressed the view that
the proper approach to the definition of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter was a purposive one. The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the
Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it
was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to
protect ... The interpretation should be, as the judgement in Southam emphasizes,
a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the
guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection.
At the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right
or freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum,
and must therefore, as this Court's decision in Law Society of Upper Canada v.
[VOL 29 NO. 1
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Skapinker, [1984] S.C.R. 357 illustrates, be placed in its proper linguistic,
philosophic and historical contexts.
8
According to Dickson, then, interpretations of the Charter
should be generous rather than legalistic, aimed at fulfilling the
interests or objects that document was meant to protect. These
objects are to play a far more central role in its interpretation than
is typically the case with many other types of legal standards and
instruments like tax laws or administrative regulations. It is this
fact, no doubt, which led one legal commentator to remark that the
"Charter imposes substantive new responsibilities on the courts. It
requires not only that they deal with new issues but that they
reconsider traditional methods of reasoning."9 They must eschew a
narrow legalistic approach to Charter adjudication in favour of a
much broader one which more firmly focuses on the interests or
objects that the Charter sets out to protect. Of course, these objects
are often none other than those fundamental rights and freedoms of
political morality to which the Charter gives legal protection.
It is reasonably clear, then, that the Supreme Court of
Canada believes that the interpretation of the Charter should be
governed by the objects or interests it was meant to protect. If so,
then it is also reasonably clear that moral argument will often figure
in Charter challenges. If one must interpret the Charter in light of
its objects, and those objects are often moral rights and freedoms,
then it follows that one cannot determine what the Charter means,
and thus the conditions upon legal validity which it imposes, without
determining the nature and extent of the rights of political morality
it seeks to guarantee. Yet, one cannot do this without engaging in
substantive moral argument. This argument will of course be
sensitive to the linguistic, philosophic, and historical context in which
the Charter is to be placed. This, however, is not an objection to
the point being made here, since such sensitivity is precisely what
one would expect of responsible reflection concerning moral
entitlements. It would be a serious mistake to think that reasoning
8 R v. Big M Dug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart].
9 W.W. Black, "Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in J.E. Magnet, ed.,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 2.
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about moral rights and freedoms, whether private or public, can take
place independently of contextual considerations. What one is
entitled to expect from government, other public institutions, and
indeed from other private citizens, depends in large part upon
shared understandings, expectations, historical circumstances, and so
on - in short, on the linguistic, philosophic and historical context in
which all moral arguments must take place 0
So, the manner in which Canadian judges approach their task
of interpreting and applying the Charter seems to offer some basis
for the premise that moral argument is often involved in Charter
adjudication. But more support is obviously needed, if only because
the evidentiary value of judicial testimony in these matters may be
open to question. Consider a parallel with the philosophy of
science. Many philosophers of science adopt the methodological
principle that it is better to look at what scientists actually do, rather
than to what they say about what they do, when looking to support
or question theories about the nature of science or of scientific
methodology and reasoning. One obvious reason for this principle
is the simple fact that being a good scientist in no way guarantees
that one is a good philosopher, no more than being a good
philosopher means one can do elementary-particle physics. Richard
Feynman, the celebrated physicist and Nobel prize winner, had the
following to say concerning the suggestion that scientists should give
more consideration to social problems, in particular, that they should
1OA current trend within modem moral philosophy stresses the essential role of local
custom and practice in defining the standards of moral deliberation appropriate for use within
a local community. On this view, "rationalist" attempts to discover universal, moral principles
valid for all times and places are thoroughly misguided. Moral standards, are in part "local"
and conventionally based. Writers who fall within this movement include B. Williams, S.
Hampshire and A. Baier. For a representative sample of the thoughts of such writers, see
S. Clarke & E. Simpson, eds, Anti Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (Albany: SUNY,
1989). See also E. Simpson, Good Lives and Moral Education (New York: P. Lang, 1989).
Recognizing the importance of context and local circumstances in moral reasoning is perfectly
consistent with the belief in universal moral principles, valid for all times and places. Given
different expectations, mutual understandings, and historical circumstances, principles like the
principle of utility will license very different actions, laws, and institutional arrangements. The
utilitarian will only insist that the validity of his or her ultimate principle is not itself
determined by "local" understanding or conventional agreement. So we needn't take a stand
on these controversial issues of moral theory to appreciate the Supreme Court's view that
interpretation of Charter rights must be sensitive to "linguistic, philosophic and historical
contexts."
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be more responsible in considering the impact of science on society:
"I believe that a scientist looking at non-scientific problems is just as
dumb as the next guy - and when he talks about a non-scientific
matter, he sounds as naive as anyone untrained in the matter."11
Perhaps Feynman's point, made only partly in jest, can be
generalized to other non-scientific questions, such as the proper
philosophical characterization of science and scientific reasoning. If
so, then we must accept the theoretical possibility that scientists
generally misconceive what it is they are up to when they set out to
construct scientific hypotheses and theories. They may think, for
instance, that they are discovering objective, theory-independent
facts, when in reality their so-called objective facts are thoroughly
theory laden. They may think that they are ascertaining the nature
of a material reality which, in the words of David Hume, "would
exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or
annihilated, 12 when in actual fact there is no such reality at all, and
Berkeley was right when he exclaimed, "esse est percipi.''13  If such
instances of widespread misconception are possible within science,
then why not in law? Is it not possible that Canadian judges simply
misconceive the fundamental nature of the enterprise in which they
are engaged? If so, then they may all think that they are sometimes
engaged in substantive moral argument in Charter challenges when
in fact they are not, just as they may think that in hard cases, their
decisions are discretionary, when in fact they are attempts to enforce
pre-existing legal rights.
In answer to this radically sceptical objection to reliance on
judicial testimony, the following may well suffice. While we must
R.P. Feynman, "What Do You Care What Other People Think?' - Further Adventures
of a Curious Character (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988) at 240.
12 D. Hume, as quoted in M. Calkins, ed., Berkeley Selections (New York: C. Scribners
Sons, 1957) at xxii.
13 G. Berkeley, A Treatie Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1982) at 24, s. 3.
14 According to R. Dworkin, judicial decisions attempt typically to enforce existing legal
rights, despite judicial rhetoric about the need for judicial legislation within the "gaps" or
"interstices" of law. See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986)
at 359-63 [hereinafter Law's Empire].
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accept the theoretical possibility that Canadian courts are generally
confused about what it is they are about in Charter cases, the
burden of proof is surely on one who wishes seriously to urge this
possibility as a sufficient reason to dismiss judicial characterizations
of judicial practice. If those who participate in legal adjudication
believe their practice requires X, then barring any good reason to
the contrary, we philosophers who seek to provide theoretical
accounts of the law, are surely justified in accepting that the practice
really does require X. Yet the purely theoretical possibility of
widespread misconception is clearly not reason enough; we should
not be Cartesian sceptics in such cases, sceptics for whom the mere
logical possibility of error precludes acceptance of the obvious.
Assume, however, that I am wrong about this and that the
way the judges view what they do has absolutely no probative force
whatsoever because they could be wrong - just as most everyone
was at one time wrong in thinking that the Earth is flat. If this is
true, then our only avenue for determining whether the judges are
right in thinking that moral argument does sometimes figure
prominently in Charter cases is to look ourselves at what they
actually do, how they actually decide Charter cases. Fortunately, this
task poses little difficulty. A careful reading of virtually any Charter
challenge reveals that moral argument does play a vital role. I shall
conclude my defence of the premise that moral argument plays a
role in Charter adjudication by briefly examining one such case,
Andrews v. Law Society of B.C. 5
This appeal was heard before the B.C. Court of Appeal and
raised the issue of whether a requirement of Canadian citizenship as
a prerequisite to the practice of law was in violation of section 15
of the Charter. Section 15 falls under the title "Equality Rights" and
reads as follows:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
15 Andrews v. Law Society of B.C, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafterAndrews].
The Court of Appeal's decision was later upheld (3 to 2) by the Supreme Court of Canada.
See Law Society of B.C. v. Andrews, [1989] 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1. Though there are some
ikaportant differences between the reasoning of the two Courts, they do not affect the
argument of this paper and will be ignored. I will concentrate exclusively on the elegant
judgment of McLachlin J.A. (as she then was).
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particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Section 15 makes it unconstitutional for any law or other legal
instrument to discriminate against persons, unless such discrimination
can be justified under section 1 of the Charter.16 Section 1 states
that:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
The question whether section 1 could be used to override section 15
was crucial to the case.
The major issue before the Court was whether the
citizenship requirement imposed by the Law Society of British
Columbia amounted to discrimination. This question led to another
more basic issue of both moral and philosophical importance: how
does one define discrimination for purposes of interpreting section
15? It is in answering this latter question that we see the first signs
of substantive moral argument. Three basic answers were proposed.
First, there was the definition proposed by the Law Society which
had been accepted by the trial judge.
D1: L is discriminatory if and only if "it draws an irrational or irrelevant distinction
between people based on some irrelevant personal characteristic for the purpose,
or having the effect of imposing on certain of them, a penalty, disadvantage or
indignity, or denying them an advantage."
17
The key here is the notion of rationality; a law is discriminatory only
if there is no rational basis for it. It might be highly objectionable
in many other ways, but so long as any distinction it draws is
rational in light of what the law sets out to do, then the law is not
16 For reasons of simplicity, and because it in no way affects the arguments of this
paper, we shall ignore the possibility of a section 33 override. The latter empowers
Parliament or the legislature of a province to "expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or
of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate
notwithstanding a provision included within section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of [the Charter]."
Section 33 also provides that a declaration made under its terms "shall cease to have effect
five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the
declaration" and that re-enactment is possible.
17 Andrews, supra, note 15 at 246.
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discriminatory. This is a fairly weak definition in the sense that it
employs means-end rationality as its criterion for discrimination.
Regardless of the ends sought, or the effect upon people of the
means used in realizing those ends, a law is not discriminatory so
long as it really does work effectively towards its ends. The result,
as the B.C. Court well realized, is that many laws which ruthlessly
but effectively help to realize morally objectionable ends, or which
serve to victimize innocent parties, will be judged non-discriminatory.
As a consequence, the Court rejected D1. This definition is surely
not what "equality" and "freedom from discrimination" mean.
A second definition was proposed by Andrews:
D2: t is discriminatory if it draws any adverse distinction on the basis of a
personal characteristic or category.
The Court was equally unhappy with this definition. Were it to be
adopted, a vast number of existing laws, which necessarily draw
adverse distinctions among people based on personal characteristics,
would be deemed discriminatory and thus in violation of section 15.
This consequence in itself was sufficient reason, in the Court's mind,
for thinking that D2 is unacceptable, though it went on to list
several other reasons why the definition had to be rejected.1
A third possibility was accepted by the Appeal Court and
used as their basis for finding in favour of the appellant:
D3: L is discriminatory if it draws a unreasonable or unfair distinctions,
distinctions which are unduly prejudicial.i
There are some important observations to be made regarding D3.
In the view of the Court, the test under D3 must be objective, that
is, based on whether the law is in fact discriminatory, not on
whether the lawmakers, or those who might have acted under its
authority, sincerely believed that it was discriminatory. Were the
test subjective, then perhaps one would be required to establish only
non-moral, empirical facts about what people's moral beliefs actually
are or were. But an objective test clearly means that the Court
must itself determine whether L, in actual fact, does draw
18 bid at 249.
19 hid at 250-52.
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unreasonable or unfair distinctions. This determination cannot be
made independent of moral deliberation:
[Tihe question to be answered under S.15 should be whether the impugned
distinction is reasonable or fair, having regard to the purposes and aims and its
effect on persons adversely affected. I include the word "fair" as well as
"reasonable" to emphasize that the test is not one of pure rationality [as with D1]
but one connoting the treatment of persons in ways which are not unduly
prejudicial to them. This test must be objective, and the discrimination must be
proved on the balance of probabilities ... The ultimate question is whether a
fair-minded person, weighing the purposes of legislation against its effects on the
individuals adversely affected, and giving due weight to the right of the Legislature
to pass laws for the good of all, would conclude that the legislative means adopted
are unreasonable or unfair.
2 0
Plainly, this test for discrimination requires moral
deliberation. Indeed, the parallel between the test proposed - what
a fair-minded person would conclude - and what is required by
"ideal observer theories" of morality is striking.21 The Court is clear
in its view that the test is neither subjective, nor based on pure
means-end rationality. On the contrary, it is objective, and based on
what is fair and reasonable.
Upon adopting D3 as the criterion of discrimination, the
Court went on to apply it to the Andrews situation. They ruled that
the Law Society's citizenship requirement was indeed discriminatory,
and thus in violation of section 15, because it was neither fair nor
reasonable for someone in Andrews' position to be denied a licence
to practice law. The Court rejected the Society's contention that
lawyers, because they are involved in the processes or structures of
government, should be citizens, and not merely residents, of Canada:
While lawyers clearly play an important role in our society, it cannot be contended
that the practice of law involves performing a state or government function. In this
20 Ibi. at 252-53.
21 Ideal observer theories vary, but generally they make a claim similar to the following:
"If we want to know whether something is morally right, the question is: 'Would it be
permitted by the moral code which an omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate [or
benevolent] but otherwise normal person would most strongly tend to support as the moral
code for a society in which he expected to live?' See R.B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and
the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). The theory appears to have originated in
Adam Smith's The Theory of the Moral Sentiments (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
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respect the role of lawyers may be distinguished from that of legislators, judges, civil
servants and policemen.2 2
In addition, the Court ruled that authority and the persuasive
precedent of other jurisdictions support the unreasonableness of the
citizenship requirement:
The fact is that citizenship was not seen as essential to the practice of law in this
province prior to 1971. It is still not viewed as such in most jurisdictions; only two
other provinces require lawyers to be citizens. In the tradition of the British
Commonwealth, citizenship has never been a requirement for the right to practise
law. These facts belie the contention that citizenship is vitally and integrally
connected with the lawyer's role in society.
After putting all these moral, philosophic, and historical factors
together, the Court was prepared to rule that discrimination - unfair
and unreasonable adverse treatment on the basis of a personal
characteristic - had indeed occurred and that section 15 had
therefore been infringed.
Of course, the violation of a Charter right does not in itself
entail that the offending measure is unconstitutional and therefore
invalid. It may yet be justified under section 1, which validates
infringements under certain conditions. The question therefore
arose whether a citizenship requirement, acknowledged to be unfair
and therefore discriminatory, could nonetheless be justified in a free
and democratic society. A second question arose too, which had to
be answered first: How does one go about answering the first
question? What standards, if any, apply? Fortunately an answer to
this second question had already been provided in authoritative
precedent. In Regina v. Oakes,24 the Supreme Court of Canada had
enunciated several principles to govern the application of section 1.
These may be summarized as follows:
1. The onus of proving that a limitation on any Charter
right is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and
22 Andrews, supra, note 15 at 257.
23 Ibid at 258.
24 R, v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 50 C.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Oakes cited to S.C.R.].
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democratic society rests upon the party seeking to uphold the
limitation [in this instance, the Law Society].
2. The presumption is that Charter rights are guaranteed
unless the party invoking section 1 can bring itself within the
exceptional criteria justifying their being limited.
3. The standard of proof under section 1 is [as it is under
section 15] the preponderance of probabilities.
4. It must be proven that the objectives to be served by the
measures limiting a Charter right are sufficiently important to
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or
freedom. At a minimum, the objectives must be shown to
relate to societal concerns which are pressing and substantial
in a free and democratic society.
5. It must be shown that the means chosen - the offending
provisions - are reasonable and demonstrably justified. This,
the B.C. Court noted, involves three components:
i. The measures must be fair and not arbitrary - they must
be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question
and rationally connected to it.
ii. The means should impair the right as little as possible.
iii. There must be proportionality between the effects of
the limiting measure and the objective - the more
severe the prejudicial effects of a measure, the more
important the objective must be [the "proportionality
test"].
Having set out the appropriate standards to be applied, the
Court went on to argue that section 1 could not be utilized to
justify the Law Society's discriminatory citizenship requirement. The
apparent objectives of the requirement could not be said to relate,
in any reasonably clear way, to societal concerns which are pressing
and substantial. The effects of the means chosen were not
proportional to the importance of the objectives sought, and were
in fact not rationally related to them: citizenship is in no way a
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necessary condition of being a good lawyer. The appeal was
therefore granted. The citizenship requirement was invalid owing to
its unconstitutionality.
Judging from the above analysis, it is apparent that answering
the questions posed by section 1 will often require appeal to pure
means-end rationality of the sort discussed above in relation to D1.
In addition, it will invariably require a certain amount of historical
investigation into the political morality of other democratic
jurisdictions. But as with section 15, it is also clear that section 1
sometimes demands a degree of moral deliberation. One simply
cannot determine whether a measure is fair without contemplating
moral premises. One cannot determine proportionality without
considering the moral and political importance of the various
objectives and concerns which find support in the Charter and in the
offending measures. One cannot determine whether a limit can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society without
engaging in substantive arguments of political morality. As Peter
Hogg notes,
[Tihe phrase "demonstrably justified" calls for normative judgment by the court as to
the legitimacy and necessity in a free and democratic society of the impugned
restriction on liberty and that judgment cannot depend wholly upon what has seemed
acceptable to legislative bodies in Canada and elsewhere. For good or ill, the Charter
clearly contemplates that the majoritarian judgment of A legislative body, Seven many
legislative bodies, be subject to review on Charter grounds by the courts.
Surely what is required in all these instances is not the kind
of reasoning which strives to be neutral with respect to, or totally
detached from, concerns of political morality. What is required is
normative, moral judgment which tackles the tricky issues involved
whenever one is called upon to strike a reasonable balance between
competing moral and political interests. Section 1, then, requires a
significant measure of moral reasoning.
If the arguments of the preceding sections are sound, we seem
entitled to accept the premise that Charter cases sometimes involve
moral argument. Even if one totally discounts the evidentiary value
of the judges' own reflections about their reasoning on the Charter,
we have ample evidence of how they actually carry out that task -
25 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 689.
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in what they do as opposed to what they say they do. Our
examination of Andrews illustrates that moral reasoning does occur,
as it does in many other cases as well, cases like Morgentaler and
Oakes. Indeed, if the analysis of Andrews is correct, then application
of sections 15 and 1 will almost invariably be guided, in part, by
moral considerations.
So moral deliberation does figure in Charter cases. Our next
step must be to show that it figures in the right way. That is, if
our findings are to provide support for choosing iLP over ELP, it
must be established that the moral standards employed in Charter
cases sometimes function as tests for the existence and content of
valid law. Without this additional premise, we have no basis for
preferring ILP to ELP.
Once again, it seems prima facie obvious that moral standards
do serve the role iL' admits but ELF conceives as impossible. In
Morgentaler, for instance, we have what functioned for over twenty
years as valid law being declared to have been unconstitutional and
thus of no force or effect. The ground for this declaration was
violation of section 7 of the Charter which recognizes a right to life,
liberty, and security of the person - a right which cannot be denied
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. As
the courts made plain, "fundamental justice" is to be understood as
including substantive, not merely procedural, justice. And whatever
one's view about the need for moral reasoning in determining the
nature of procedural justice, it is clear that that need is present
when substantive justice is at issue. To determine the requirements
of substantive justice (one of the interests or objects of section 7, in
terms of which that section is to be understood), one must engage
in moral reflection. If so, we seem to have legal rights, whose
content depends upon moral considerations, being used to
demonstrate the invalidity of a statutory instrument (section 251 of
the Criminal Code of Canada).2 6 This, of course, is a possibility well
recognized by ILP.
But it is not a possibility recognized by ELF. If we accept that
theory, the above account, which will be called the "Inclusive
Account" (IA) just has to be wrong. If the existence and content
26 R.S.C 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter the Criminal Code].
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of a legal right can never in any way be a function of moral
considerations, then we are inexorably led to the following
conclusions. When the Supreme Court of Canada considered
whether the proper interpretation of section 7 of the Charter
rendered it in conflict with section 251 of the Criminal Code, they
could not conceivably have been trying to determine the existence
or content of valid law. Similarly, when the B.C. Court of Appeal
considered whether section 15 must be understood in such a way
that it was unjustifiably infringed by the Law Society's citizenship
requirement, they could not conceivably have been determining the
existence or content of valid law. They could not have been
attempting to understand and apply legal tests for legal validity,
because, for example, the crucial test of discrimination, (and hence
violation of section 15) is whether people are being treated
unreasonably or unfairly - and this test, as we have seen, is, at least
sometimes, partly a moral one.
Yet if the courts were not attempting to determine the
existence and content of valid law in these cases, what were they
doing? Let us focus on Andrews once again. What could the B.C.
Court of Appeal have been doing when it addressed the question
whether the citizenship requirement was invalid because it violated
section 15, and that section 15 was violated because the requirement
was unfair to Andrews? There would seem to be only one
possibility according to ELP. If the Court was not attempting to
determine the existence and content of valid law, then it must have
been attempting to determine the existence and content of
something other than law, and applying that something else, in some
way or other, to undermine the validity of the citizenship
requirement. In applying its fairness test, the Court must have been
relying on non-legal, moral standards, not to determine that the
citizenship requirement was invalid owing to its conflict with superior
law, but to make it invalid by declaring it to be so.
27
27 Later we will consider another alternative which seems open to ELP. The Court did
not make the citizenship requirement invalid by its decision. Rather, the court determined
that it already was invalid, owing to its conflict with extra-legal moral standards. As we shall
see, however, this option is one that is not really open to the defender of ELP. He or she
pursues it at the risk of surrendering to ILP.
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It is important to be clear how exactly the Charter is to be
conceived on this alternative account, which will be referred to as
the "Exclusive Account" (EA). According to EA, section 15 does not
itself constitute or contain a legal criterion for validity. Rather, it
makes reference to an extra-legal, moral criterion to which judges
are required or at liberty to appeal in Charter challenges. Section
15 directs them to step outside of law and to seek guidance from an
external source of non-pedigreed norms, namely, the norms of
political morality. A useful parallel is perhaps to be found in
foreign law. Courts are sometimes required to make reference to,
and indeed to apply, the law of foreign legal systems in deciding
cases.28 According to EA, the Charter requires (or permits?) much
the same. It requires (or permits?) Canadian judges to make
reference to and apply the standards of what amounts to a different
kind of foreign system. And just as we would not accept that
foreign law becomes part of our legal system just because our judges
are required sometimes to apply it in their decisions, we should not
think that standards of political morality are thereby incorporated
into Canadian law as legal tests for legal validity, just because our
judges must (or may) sometimes (as in Andrews) make reference to
them when deciding Charter cases.
On EA, then, the Court in Andrews did not, when it based its
decision on the unfairness of the citizenship requirement, enforce
an existing legal right (to equality) against a measure (the citizenship
requirement) which would be valid were it not for the conflict with
section 15. On the contrary, it exercised its duty (or liberty),
imposed (or granted) by section 15 to make unconstitutional what
otherwise would have and had been perfectly valid law. The Court
did not discover a legal conflict. It discovered a conflict between
law and political morality, and by its decision settled the conflict in
favour of the latter. Of course, it is consistent with EA to claim that
the Court's decision, though it was based on the enforcement of a
moral right, created a new legal right. The effect of the decision in
Andrews would have been to grant a new legal right to lawyers not
to be subject to a citizenship requirement. The Court's decision, as
an authoritative act with the appropriate pedigree, was quite capable
28 See J. Raz, The Authoriy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 97.
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of creating such a legal right - just as decisions of Parliament, which
are themselves often based on moral reasons, are quite obviously
capable of creating new legal rights.
This, then, is the alternative account of Charter adjudication
to which ELP seems to lead. Our next step must be to consider
whether the account is an acceptable one. There are several
reasons for thinking it is not.
First, EA is simply counter-intuitive. It seems quite at odds
with our ordinary understanding of a constitutional document like
the Charter. The latter is commonly conceived as a measure which
creates fundamental legal rights Canadians possess against
governments and government agencies. It flouts that understanding
to suggest that the Charter does not in fact serve this role at all, but
instead only makes reference to non-legal, moral rights upon the
basis of which judges are empowered to create new legal rights by
invalidating what would otherwise be valid legal measures. Insofar
as it is part of the fundamental law of Canada, the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms is quite naturally viewed as itself creating
legal rights. And pointing out the fact that moral deliberation is
sometimes required for determining the content of these legal rights
does not in any way disturb that natural understanding.
Of course, it is also part of our common understanding that
standards of political morality such as one finds in the Charter are
subject to various kinds of indeterminacy. In cases where
indeterminacy figures, judges are thought to play a leading role in
shaping the contours of the political morality expressed in the
Charter. They do so, as they do in any other area of law where
indeterminacy is encountered, by exercising their discretion. The
Charter's regions of indeterminacy are perhaps greater than in many
other areas of law where more closely textured terms are used,
terms like "vehicle," "radio telegraph," and "assault." But terms like
"equality," "discrimination," and "liberty" are not so open textured as
to admit of no determinate meaning whatsoever. If so, then to the
extent that the Charter provisions employing such terms do admit of
determinate meaning, they do create fundamental legal rights
Canadians possess against government and government agencies.
To view Charter rights as analogous to foreign law, then, comes
close to an absurdity. Another factor weighing against EA is the
language chosen by Parliament to characterize the Charter. Unlike
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its predecessor, the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter is a
constitutional document. As such it has a special force, clearly
described in section 52 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982:
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.
Taken literally, this provision flatly contradicts EA, and we have yet
to see any good reason not to construe it literally. Section 52 does
not say that upon judicial declaration that a legal measure is
inconsistent with a (foreign) right referred to (but not granted by)
the Charter, the measure shall from that moment on be of no force
and effect. Rather, it says that any measure which is in conflict with
a Charter provision is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
or effect. Of course, inconsistencies do not begin to exist only when
judges declare that they exist. On the contrary, judges rule that the
inconsistencies exist only because they believe that the legal conflicts
already do exist by virtue of the Charter and its various provisions.
Those provisions include, of course, sections 7 and 15.
Any legal measure, such as section 251 or the Law Society's
citizenship requirement, which is inconsistent with either of these
provisions is, independently of a judge's decision in a Charter
challenge, of no force and effect. Yet as we have seen, the
contents of sections 15 and 7 are partly determined by
considerations of political morality. It seems to follow from the
plain language of the Charter, then, that some moral standards are
a part of Canada's accepted conditions for legal validity, something
Canadian judges seem to recognize in their decisions.
However, there are further reasons for rejecting E. For
example, it does not easily explain certain features of Charter
challenges. At the very least, any explanation it suggests is less
consonant with these features than iA, which adopts the view that
judges are indeed attempting to determine the existence and content
of valid law when they hear Charter challenges, despite their partial
reliance on moral standards. One such feature is that the legal
system treats a measure declared invalid as though it were invalid at
the time that the actions giving rise to litigation occurred.
Consider Moigentaler for example: when section 251 was finally
struck down, the obvious fact that Morgentaler had violated section
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
251 was no longer an acceptable basis for prosecution. All legal
action against Morgentaler consequently ceased. The main reason,
of course, is that in declaring section 251 unconstitutional, the Court
ruled that section 251 had been of no force or effect when the
acknowledged violations occurred. The effect of the Court's
decision was the recognition that Morgentaler had been within his
legal rights. He had not in fact performed actions which were
illegal at the time. Were EA accepted, on the other hand, illegal
acts would indeed have occurred. It was, by this reasoning, only
upon declaration of invalidity by the Court that section 251 became
invalid. Prior to that time the legislation had force and effect, and
actions in violation of it would have indeed been illegal, criminal
acts. But if so, would not prosecution still have been in order?
And if not, what is the explanation?
With LA, of course, we have a ready and obvious explanation.
The Court discovered a conflict in law between section 251 and a
more authoritative legal provision. It discovered that section 7 was
in conflict with section 251 and that the latter therefore had been
of no force and effect at the time Morgentaler and his colleagues
were procuring abortions. In short, the Court discovered that
Morgentaler had at all times been acting within his legal rights. The
legal obligations purportedly imposed by section 251 did not in fact
exist when they acted.
EA offers no ready explanation for why prosecution is so clearly
out of order. There was no recognition by the Court that its
declaration had retroactive effect, that it was declaring to have been
invalid what was in fact valid at the time, nor was there any
acknowledgement that this highly unusual step - for which a very
special type of justification would surely have been in order - was
the reason why prosecution would have to cease. Furthermore,
there was no sense that the legal system was granting Morgentaler
and his colleagues a favour by no longer prosecuting them for their
previous crimes. On the contrary, it was now clear that prosecution
was, and always had been (subsequent to the enactment of the
Charter), ruled out legally, owing to the fact that the criminal law of
abortion had been of no force and effect.
A second, related source of difficulty for EA lies in section 24
(1) which reads as follows:
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Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed
or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
Charter infringement, then, is recognized as a viable ground for legal
remedy. If EA is accurate, however, it is not at all obvious why such
a remedy should be forthcoming following a successful Charter
challenge. And the reason is simple: no legal rights would have
been violated. Any legal rights as might exist would come into
being only with the court's decision. Barring retroactivity, which
again seems not at all to have been contemplated, activities pursued
under the authority of a law later rendered invalid by a court would
have been quite legal prior to that decision. But if so, then why
should a remedy be forthcoming? The offending party violated no
one's legal rights! He may have violated a moral right, but surely it
is not the task of the judiciary to enforce non-legal moral rights
against perfectly valid legal rights.
On the other hand, if, as IA insists, the Charter does create
legal rights which exist antecedently to, and independently of,
judicial decisions in cases like Andrews, then remedies seem quite
appropriate. If the B.C. Court was correct in its interpretation of
section 15, Andrews' legal rights had been violated by the Law
Society. He should, therefore, have been entitled to an appropriate
legal remedy.
Putting all these points together, we seem to have a fairly
strong case for rejecting EA in favour of LA. It provides a much
more coherent account of Charter cases. According to iA, the
Charter creates legal rights whose content is partly dependent on
moral considerations, and judges in cases like Andrews and
Morgentaler are required to determine what these rights are and to
apply them against less authoritative, offending measures. Insofar as
ILP, but not ELP, is consistent with LA, we seem to have an important
argument in its favour.
But perhaps I have been uncharitable in characterizing the
account to which ELP seems committed. Perhaps the defender of
ELP can offer a modified account, according to which the moral
standards to which the Courts appeal in cases like Andrews and
Morgentaler are indeed foreign to the legal system, but nevertheless
serve, in virtue of their recognition within the Charter, as criteria for
legal validity. If so, then to the extent that legal measures (for
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example, section 251 of the Criminal Code or the Law Society's
citizenship requirement) are in conflict with these foreign standards,
they are legally invalid; this can be so even before the court declares
that there is a conflict in a Charter case.
Were this modified exclusive account (MEA) adopted, the
defenders of ELP would face fewer of the difficulties discussed above.
Indeed, their account would be virtually identical to LA, except for
the fact that the latter does not view the standards to which appeal
must be made in determining the content of Charter provisions as
equivalent to foreign law. In their view, the standards of fairness to
which appeal must be made in determining violations of section 15
are part of the content of that section, and therefore part of the
law. So unlike the proponents of LA, the defenders of MEA would
still want to maintain that invalidity is based on conflicts with foreign
standards. But their account would share all the other desirable
features of IA. It would be consonant with the language used in
section 52 (1) of the Charter, and with the various other features of
Charter challenges examined above. For instance, it too would have
a ready explanation for why legal remedies seem an appropriate
response in some successful Charter challenges.
Attractive as it may be, MEA is clearly a position which the
defender of ELP cannot accept. And the reason should now be fairly
obvious. It is true, on this account, that the content of a Charter
provision is not a function of moral reflection. But the same cannot
be said for the validity of measures such as the Law Society's
citizenship requirement or section 251 of the Criminal Code.
Whether the moral standards in terms of which the validity of these
measures is partly to be established are foreign or not, the fact
remains that, on MEA, legal validity is determined in part by moral
standards whose understanding requires moral deliberation. If MEA
is advanced by the defenders of ELP, they will be forced to admit
that the conditions for legal validity accepted within the Canadian
legal system include moral conditions. They will be forced to
concede, for example, that a condition for the validity of any legal
measure within Canada is that it does not unfairly discriminate
against individuals in a way which cannot be justified in a free and
democratic society. But if this is so, then the existing conditions
for valid Canadian laws include moral conditions, a possibility the
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defenders of ELP is most anxious to deny. Whether those moral
conditions are foreign or not seems really beside the point.
So the defenders of ELP appear truly committed to the original
account of EA. But we have seen ample reason to reject it in favour
of LA. If so, then we are entitled to conclude that iP provides a
much better theoretical account of Charter adjudication than ELP.
On that account, then, it is a superior theory of law.
III. Does It All Really Matter?
At the outset of this paper, I suggested that the choice of a
philosophical theory concerning the nature of law can have a
significant effect upon legal practice. I stated that such a choice
does not simply yield different descriptions of what it is that judges
do, regardless of their theory of law, or whether they in fact have a
theory at all. In what follows, I shall draw upon the discussion in
section II above and attempt to substantiate these claims.
As noted earlier, a perennial dispute within constitutional
theory concerns the proper approach to judicial review and the
interpretation of constitutional documents. This dispute has raged
for decades in the United States, at least since Marbury v.
Madison,29 when the American Supreme Court definitively ruled
that it did indeed have the perogative to strike down legislation
which offended the Bill of Rights. As we saw above, section 52 (1)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms undeniably grants
a similar right to Canadian judges. The only real question, in the
United States and Canada, is how this perogative is to be exercised.
What exactly is it that judges are empowered to do when utilizing
a constitutional instrument to invalidate other less authoritative legal
measures? In short, what approach must judges take in interpreting
a charter or bill of rights?
The answers which have been given to this question are, of
course, numerous and varied, but they all seem to fall roughly within
one of three categories: (a) those who think that judges should be
faithful to the text of the constitution; (b) those who believe that
29 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the proper object of deference is the intent of the original framers;
and (c) those who claim that judges should view the constitution as
a "living tree" and interpret it in ways which express an
ever-changing and developing political morality30 Position (a) has
been variously described as the "literalist," "strict constructionist," or
"textualist" theory, and it appears to have been this view to which
Chief Justice Brian Dickson was expressing his opposition in Big M
Drug Mart and Hunter v. Southam Inc31  Position (b) is often
referred to as the "intentionalist," "originalist," or "original intent"
approach. It has found support in the United States from such legal
figures as Robert Bork and William Rehnquist.!2 It has also been
roundly criticized by many legal philosophers as being at best
misguided, at worst incoherent.33
Despite their differences, (a) and (b), the literalist and
originalist theories, are both frequently viewed as requiring judicial
restraint in the interpretation and application of constitutions. Each
is thought to require political and moral neutrality on the part of
judges, something which is thought essential to the fulfilment of the
judicial role within liberal democracies. Anything less than this
amounts to the naked usurpation of the legislative function, a
function properly fulfilled by elected political representatives. On
each of these views, constitutional interpretation is essentially a
30 The "living tree" metaphor was first applied to the B.N.A Act by Lord Sankey in
Edwards v. A.-G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136. According to Lord Sankey, "the B.N.A. Act
planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits." As
Hogg notes, 'The Supreme Court of Canada has approved the living tree metaphor" in
numerous cases. See Hogg, supra, note 25 at 340-41. Among these are A.-G. Quebec v.
Blailkie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 at 1029, and Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984]
1 S.C.R. 357 at 365.
31 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 8 at 344, Hunter v. Soudam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
32 See R. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems" (1971) 47
Ind. L.J. 1, and W. Rehnquist, "The Notion of a Living Constitution" (1976) 54 Tex. L. Rev.
693.
33 For critiques of the originalist position, see D. Lyons, "Constitutional Interpretation
and Original Meaning" in J. Coleman & E. Paul, eds, Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Blackwell's,
1987) at 26-29; D. Brink, "Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review' (1988)
17:2 Phil, & Pub. Afr. at 105; Law's Empire, supra, note 14 at 359-63. See also 318-34 which
deals with an analogous account of statutory interpretation.
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value-neutral activity, requiring nothing more than factual inquiry,
either into the meaning of words, as governed by linguistic
conventions, or the historical intentions of a (possibly long dead)
group of founders.
Position (c), by contrast, is commonly conceived to require a
more activist, liberal approach. Calling this approach "liberal" can
be somewhat misleading, however, if only because a liberal approach
to the interpretation of constitutions is often associated with a
commitment to political liberalism. Yet as is plain from the history
of the American Supreme Court in the early part of this century,
that association amounts to a confusion. The American Court was
notorious for employing a liberal approach to interpretation of the
American Bill of Rights in an attempt to undermine the liberal
policies of the Roosevelt administration. Peter Hogg puts the point
nicely:
In the United States, where the legacy of slavery and the persistence of systematic
racial discrimination dominates political discourse, the fact that activist judicial review
has since 1954 made an important contribution to the elimination of racial
discrimination has persuaded many liberals to embrace judicial activism. Before 1937,
when progressive social and economic legislation was threatened by activist judicial
review, liberals advocated judicial restraint. 34
In any event, position (c) is commonly thought to require that
judges take an active part in ensuring that the constitution is
consonant with current trends in political morality. The metaphor
commonly used in Canada is the "living tree." According to the
defenders of this approach, reference to political morality is essential
to determining what the constitution really means within a
contemporary context. To use Dworkin's terminology, the
constitution defines the concepts in terms of which questions of
fundamental legal rights are to be argued; it is up to each
generation to provide, in view of its historical, moral, legal, and
political circumstances, the best (or at least its own) conception of
Hogg, supra, note 25 at 99, n. 92. An example of a "liberal" approach to the Bill of
Rights which led to the suppression of "liberal" legislation is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a state law forbidding employment
in a bakery for more than 60 hours per week or 10 hours per day. The Court held that this
statute deprived the employer of his liberty of contract without "due process of law," a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. For further discussion of the misleading nature of the
distinction between liberal and conservative judges, see Law's Empire, supra, note 14 at 358-59.
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those concepts. Each generation must, that is, provide the best
theoretical account or interpretation of concepts such as liberty,
justice, and equality3 5 Judges take a leading role in reaching such
understandings.
According to the critics of (c), on the other hand, the latter
permits active meddling in the legislative process by unelected
judges. It allows judges to subvert the real constitution to be
discovered, not in political morality, but within the "four corners" of
the document, or alternatively, by recourse to the intentions of the
framers. It permits judges unjustifiably to pursue their own, possibly
idiosyncratic, visions of political morality at the expense of the law
enshrined in a constitution properly adopted by appropriate political
means.
In very rough outline, then, these are the three basic
approaches which have been taken in recent debates concerning
constitutional adjudication and judicial review. Each is believed by
its defenders to represent the only way to show fidelity to the
constitution. One might reasonably wonder how the choice among
these three general approaches could in any way be connected to
the choice between ILP or ELP. But the connections, both
theoretical and practical, are not difficult to see.3 6
Let us begin with an uncontroversial assumption: judges
generally prefer to view and present themselves as always applying
the law. Whether, on their own theories of adjudication they think
this appropriate, or whether they are mainly concerned with how
their activities will be viewed by the general public, judges do prefer
to conceive and characterize what they do as involving nothing but
35 On this view of constitutional interpretation, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) at 106-7, 131-49. See also Law's Empire,
supra, note 14 at 355. For views generally sympathetic to this approach to constitutional
interpretation, see Brink, supra, note 33 at 105, and Lyons, supra, note 33 at 26-29. See also
D. Richards, "Constitutional Interpretation, History, and the Death Penalty: A Book Review"
(1983) 71 Calif. L Rev. 1372 at 1372-98. Dworkin borrows the distinction between concepts
and conceptions from J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971) at 5-6.
36 One of the principal aims of Brink, supra, note 33 at 26-29 is to establish similar
connections between legal philosophy and constitutional theory. Although there is much in
this article with which I would take issue, the general themes pursued are similar to those
advanced here.
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the application of pre-existing law. They are uncomfortable thinking
of themselves as doing anything else.
Consider the following remarks by Lord Radcliffe, concerning
the law-making activities of judges:
I do not believe that it was ever an important discovery that judges are in some sense
lawmakers. It is much more important to analyze the relative truth of an idea so far
reaching; because unless the analysis is strict and its limitations observed, there is a
real danger in its elaboration. We cannot run the risk of finding the archetypal image
of the judge confused with the very different image of the legislator.
3 7
Consider also, the following advice offered by Lord Radcliffe a few
pages earlier:
[]udges will serve the public interest better if they keep quiet about their legislative
function. No doubt they will discreetly contribute to change in the law, because, as I
have said, they cannot do otherwise, even if they would. But the judge who shows his
hand, who advertises what he is about, may indeed show that his is a strong spirit
unfettered by the past, though I doubt very much whether he is not doing more harm
to general confidence in the law as a constant, safe in the hands of judges, than he is
doingood to the law's credit as a set of rules nicely attuned to the sentiment of theday.l a
It is unlikely that many judges share Lord Radcliffe's desire to
perpetuate this version of the "noble lie." But his Lordship's
comments do illustrate the obvious concern most judges have to be
viewed, principally, as upholders of the law that is.
39
We may take as given, then, that judges prefer to apply, and
to be seen as applying, pre-existing law. We may also take for
granted that most people within western democracies share this
preference with the judges. Most are uncomfortable with the
suggestion that judges may be up to something other than law
application, hence Lord Radcliffe's concern. People are generally
3 7 Lord Radcliffe, The Law and Its Compass (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1960) at 14.
3 8 Ibid. at 11.
39 There are, of course, notable exceptions to this generalization. An obvious example
is Lord Denning. On Denning's propensity to "seek justice despite the law," see P. Robson
& P. Watchman, eds, Justice Lord Denning and tie Constitution (Westmead: Gower, 1981)
and my review in (1982) Can. Phil. Rev. 2. That Denning is so roundly condemned by most
English judges supports the view that judges are uncomfortable with anything which threatens
Radcliffe's "archetypal image."
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willing to accept the odd hard case in which judges act as quasi-
legislators. Everyone readily embraces the idea of judges sometimes
being called upon to perform extra-judicial functions, say in federal
inquiries like the Warren and Dubin Commissions.40 But when they
are acting as judges, concerning themselves with legal rights, their
business, most think, is with the law, not politics or morality.41
If the existence of these preferences, and the beliefs upon
which they are based, can be taken for granted, then it is clear that
the choice between iLP and ELP really is a significant one for legal
practice. According to the latter, any reference to political morality
cannot be a reference to pre-existing law. It follows that when
judges interpret a document like the Charter in terms of its interests
or objects, they step beyond the application of law. When the B.C.
Court of Appeal struck down the citizenship requirement on
grounds of its unfairness, they were not performing the role which
most think appropriate for judges. If ELP were accepted as
accurately reflecting the nature of law, then the tendency would be
for judges to retreat from arguments of political morality in Charter
challenges. And if political morality is excluded entirely, we seem left
with things like "literal meaning," "framers' intent," and so on. But
these are the considerations which are associated with positions (a)
and (b) above, views which, within today's political climate, are used
to argue for judicial restraint.
If, by contrast, a judge is thought in a case like Andrews to be
discovering the existence or content of pre-existing, valid law, then
such a retreat is far less likely. She and others will view her
decision, not as one which encroaches upon forbidden territory, but
as one which is required by the normal judicial duty to discover and
apply the law that is. There will be nothing suspicious here requiring
40 The Warren Commission, headed by Warren J., investigated the events surrounding
the assassination of President John Kennedy. Dubin C.J.O., oversaw an inquiry into the
events surrounding the disqualification from the Seoul Summer Olympics of Canadian sprinter
Ben Johnson.
41 Members of the so-called "Critical Legal Studies Movement" are concerned, of course,
to challenge this archetypal image as a sham. They also see it as representing a pernicious
ideology masking the various contradictory and manipulative political forces at work in the law.
See A- Hutchinson & P. Monahan, eds, The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto:
Carswell, 1987).
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any special justification. There will be no danger that the archetypal
image of the judge will be confused with the very different image of
judge as legislator, politician, or moral reformer.
So it is reasonably clear that the choice between ILP and ELF
can indeed be important for legal practice. If judges are generally
reluctant to step beyond the law in rendering their decisions, and if
they conceive, or believe that others conceive, the law in such a way
that its discovery requires no recourse to arguments of political
morality, then they will be led quite naturally to positions (a) or (b).
They will shy away from an "activist" approach to the interpretation
of the Charter, and will instead fashion their arguments in terms of
"framers' intent," "literal meaning," and so on. In short, ELF leads
quite naturally to judicial restraint, or to forced attempts to give the
appearance of judicial restraint. If, on the other hand, judges
conceive, or believe that others conceive, the law in such a way that
its discovery does sometimes require moral reflection, then they will
much more easily be led to some version of position (c). They will
not see a danger that their activism will develop into, or be viewed
as, the naked usurpation of the legislative role.
If the above is essentially correct, then we have reason to
believe that philosophical reflection concerning the nature of law is
indeed a very important activity for those engaged in, or who reflect
upon, legal practice. I should like to end, however, with one
cautionary note. The fact that the acceptance of ELP, given the
archetypal image of judge as law-applier, leads naturally to theories
of judicial restraint is in no way a valid argument for or against it as
a philosophical theory. The practical implications of a philosophical
theory's acceptance (or rejection) has no probative force at all when
it comes to considering its truth or adequacy. It has no more force
than the fact that acceptance of the Copernican theory had
profound, and perhaps somewhat undesirable, social effects.
Copernicanism certainly shook the established order and the
confidence Europeans had in the Catholic faith. Yet these facts in
no way argued against the scientific adequacy or truth or what
Copernicus had set out to prove. The same is true in philosophy.
The theoretical adequacy or truth of a philosophical theory is not
influenced by the practical effects of its acceptance or rejection.
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The fact that acceptance of ELF would probably lead causally to
judicial restraint is neither an argument for or against it.42
My aim in section III, then, has not been to provide a further
argument against EL?. It has been to argue for the value of legal
philosophy, to lend credence to the proposition that discovering the
truth about the nature of law really can matter. But if the truth
proves uncomfortable or otherwise undesirable, our move should not
be to abandon or subvert it, but to adapt ourselves and our thinking
so as to live better with its consequences.
42 See The Weak Social Thesis, supra, note 2 at 27-29.
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